Arguments figure prominently in our practices of reason-giving. For example, we use them to advance reasons for their conclusions in order to justify believing something, to explain why we believe something, and to persuade others to believe something. Intuitively, using arguments in these ways requires a certain degree of self-reflection. In this paper, I ask: what cognitive requirements are there for using an argument to advance reasons for its conclusion? Towards a partial response, the paper’s central thesis is that in order to so use an argument one must believe the associated inference claim to the effect that the premises collectively are reasons that support the conclusion. I then argue against making it a further cognitive requirement that one be aware of one’s justification for believing such an inference claim. This thesis provides a rationale for the typical informal-logic textbook characterization of argument and motivates a constraint on adequate accounts of what are referred to as inference claims in the informal logic and argumentation literatures.

论据在我们的推理实践中占有重要地位。例如，我们使用它们来为他们的结论提出理由，以证明相信某事的正当性，解释我们为什么相信某事，并说服他人相信某事。直觉上，以这些方式使用论点需要一定程度的自我反省。在本文中，我要问：使用论证来推进其结论的理由有哪些认知要求？对于部分回应，该论文的中心论点是，为了如此使用一个论点，人们必须相信相关的推论声称前提集体是支持结论的理由。然后，我反对将其作为进一步的认知要求，即人们意识到自己有理由相信这样的推理主张。