Concepts are central in applied ethics as points of reference for moral deliberation. Applied ethicists generally rely on shared methodological standards for the justification of the use of concepts, such as standards of coherence and of relevance; concepts that are incoherent or irrelevant for the purposes of any particular moral inquiry are not justified as points of reference in that inquiry. This article treats one such standard of justification, namely, the standard of usefulness. According to that standard, concepts are not justified as points of reference if they do not contribute to solving real-world problems. It is argued that many applied ethicists implicitly rely on the standard of usefulness, which merits the attention of applied ethicists and theorists dedicated to methodological problems in applied ethics.

中文翻译：

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概念作为应用伦理学方法论参考点的有用性

概念是应用伦理学的核心，作为道德审议的参考点。应用伦理学家通常依靠共同的方法标准来证明使用概念的正当性，例如连贯性和相关性标准；对于任何特定的道德调查而言，不连贯或不相关的概念都不能作为该调查的参考点。本文讨论了这样一种证明标准，即有用性标准。根据该标准，如果概念无助于解决现实世界的问题，则不能将其作为参考点。有人认为，许多应用伦理学家隐含地依赖于有用性标准，这值得应用伦理学家和致力于应用伦理学方法论问题的理论家关注。