This paper investigates how analyst forecast optimism is associated with disclosures of internal control material weaknesses (ICMWs) and their remediation under Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Drawing on agency theory, I hypothesize that analysts are likely to issue earnings forecasts that are more optimistic for firms with ICMW disclosures than for those without ICMW disclosures. Using a sample of 20,875 firm-year observations with 10-K (10-Q) reports from 2004 to 2018, I find a positive association between ICMW disclosures and analyst forecast optimism. This positive association is partially driven by investors’ inability to unravel analyst forecast bias and analysts’ intentions to curry favor with management for private information. In addition, analysts are found to issue less optimistic forecasts for firms with ICMW remediation disclosures compared with those without ICMW remediation disclosures. A series of propensity score matching and regression analyses are conducted to test the robustness of my inferences. Overall, the paper suggests that analysts have incentives to take the opportunity of firms disclosing ICMWs to bias their forecasts upward for self-interest. The findings have the potential to assist regulators in guiding analyst behavior and educating investors to unravel positive bias in analyst forecasts.

本文调查了分析师预测乐观与内部控制重大缺陷 (ICMW) 的披露及其根据《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》第 404 条的补救措施之间的关系（硫氧化物）。根据代理理论，我假设分析师可能会发布对有 ICMW 披露的公司比没有 ICMW 披露的公司更乐观的盈利预测。使用 20,875 个公司年度观察样本和 2004 年至 2018 年的 10-K (10-Q) 报告，我发现 ICMW 披露与分析师预测乐观之间存在正相关关系。这种积极的关联部分是由于投资者无法消除分析师的预测偏见以及分析师有意讨好管理层以获取私人信息。此外，与没有披露 ICMW 补救措施的公司相比，分析师发现对披露了 ICMW 补救措施的公司的预测不太乐观。进行了一系列倾向得分匹配和回归分析来测试我的推论的稳健性。全面的，该论文表明，分析师有动机利用公司披露 ICMW 的机会，出于自身利益将其预测上调。这些发现有可能帮助监管机构指导分析师的行为，并教育投资者消除分析师预测中的积极偏见。