Payments for ecosystem services (PES) can encourage land owners to manage their land in a biodiversity-friendly way. To increase the effectiveness of PES for biodiversity conservation, incentives could be set to reach a minimum size of conservation area and a suitable spatial connectivity between conserved areas. However, little knowledge exists about which incentives most likely generate such landscape patterns since threshold effects and spatial connectivity have been mostly considered separately. Therefore, we present results from a framed field experiment with Indonesian oil palm farmers and compare the effectiveness between two conditional group payment schemes: In the first one, the size threshold payment, payments are made if at least three farmers in the group conserve. In the second one, an agglomeration payment, payments are made if at least three farmers with bordering land engage in conservation. Our results suggest that both PES designs are similarly effective in the absence of communication. Under both, communication increases conservation outcomes in the case of previous successful coordination and is ineffective in the case of previous coordination failure. Yet, for individuals who are reluctant to conserve, communication only increases conservation outcomes under the size threshold payment. We further discuss potential welfare implications of our results.

生态系统服务 (PES) 付款可以鼓励土地所有者以有利于生物多样性的方式管理他们的土地。为了提高 PES 对生物多样性保护的有效性，可以设置激励措施，以达到保护区的最小规模和保护区之间合适的空间连通性。然而，由于阈值效应和空间连通性大多被单独考虑，因此对于哪些激励最有可能产生这种景观模式知之甚少。因此，我们展示了对印度尼西亚油棕农民进行的框架式田间试验的结果，并比较了两种有条件的团体付款计划之间的有效性：在第一个方案中，规模阈值付款，如果该团体中至少有三名农民进行保护，则付款。在第二个，聚合支付，如果至少三名拥有边界土地的农民从事保护工作，则支付费用。我们的结果表明，两种 PES 设计在没有通信的情况下同样有效。在这两种情况下，在先前协调成功的情况下，交流会增加保护成果，而在先前协调失败的情况下则无效。然而，对于不愿意保护的个人，交流只会在支付规模阈值的情况下增加保护结果。我们进一步讨论了我们结果的潜在福利影响。在先前成功协调的情况下，沟通会增加保护成果，而在先前协调失败的情况下则无效。然而，对于不愿意保护的个人，交流只会在支付规模阈值的情况下增加保护结果。我们进一步讨论了我们结果的潜在福利影响。在先前成功协调的情况下，沟通会增加保护成果，而在先前协调失败的情况下则无效。然而，对于不愿意保护的个人，交流只会在支付规模阈值的情况下增加保护结果。我们进一步讨论了我们结果的潜在福利影响。