ABSTRACT

Since 2018, an increasing number of Iran-backed armed groups have started to be integrated into the Syrian and Iraqi official armed forces. The integration of armed groups allows Tehran to enjoy a multi-layered, longer-term, and potentially less expensive influence in Iraq and Syria. Besides, underlying ideological and ideational ties between the armed groups and Iran continue to affect their strategic choices. Meanwhile, and in order to preserve its ability to directly impact the developments, Tehran continues to support an array of smaller militias outside the state structures. This indicates a shifting pattern in Iran’s regional network, from relying predominantly on non-state actors to enjoying a more complex set of non-state and semi-state allies. The consolidation of this model could have considerable implications for Iraq and Syria: 1- Dual loyalties in the Iraqi and Syrian states will make it difficult to form an inclusive government and promote national unity; 2- Anti-American and anti-Israeli ideological elements in the Iraqi and Syrian armed forces’ structure could prevent establishing better ties with the US or Israel; 3- The concern of Iran’s regional rivals over the expansion of Tehran’s influence in Iraq and Syria turns the two countries into a theater for regional confrontations.

摘要

自 2018 年以来，越来越多的伊朗支持的武装团体开始融入叙利亚和伊拉克的官方武装部队。武装团体的整合使德黑兰能够在伊拉克和叙利亚享有多层次、长期且成本可能较低的影响力。此外，武装团体与伊朗之间潜在的意识形态和观念联系继续影响他们的战略选择。与此同时，为了保持其直接影响事态发展的能力，德黑兰继续支持国家结构之外的一系列较小的民兵组织。这表明伊朗地区网络的格局正在发生转变，从主要依赖非国家行为体转变为拥有更复杂的非国家和半国家盟友。这种模式的整合可能会对伊拉克和叙利亚产生重大影响：1-伊拉克和叙利亚国家的双重忠诚将使组建包容性政府和促进民族团结变得困难；2- 伊拉克和叙利亚武装部队结构中的反美和反以色列意识形态因素可能会阻碍与美国或以色列建立更好的关系；3- 伊朗的地区竞争对手担心德黑兰在伊拉克和叙利亚的影响力扩大，这使两国变成了地区对抗的战场。