Identity signals are those common components of communication transmissions that inform receivers of the signaler’s membership in a categorizable subset of individuals. Such signals may be overt, broadcast to all possible receivers, or covert, encrypted so that only similar receivers are likely to perceive their identity-relevant meaning. Here we present an instrumental theory of covert signaling, based on the function of identity signals in social assortment. We argue that covert signaling is favored when signalers are generous toward strangers, when costs of being discovered as dissimilar are high, and when the ability to assort only with preferred partners is restricted. We further argue that covert signaling should be more common among members of “invisible” minorities, who are less likely to encounter similar individuals by chance. We formalize this theory with an evolutionary model to more rigorously explore the consequences of our assumptions. Our results have implications for our understanding of numerous aspects of social life, including communication, cooperation, social identity, humor, pragmatics, politics, hate speech, and the maintenance of diversity. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved)

中文翻译：

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隐蔽信号是一种适用于不同人群的自适应通信策略。

身份信号是通信传输的那些常见组件，它们通知接收者信号者在可分类的个人子集中的成员资格。这样的信号可以是公开的，广播给所有可能的接收者，也可以是隐蔽的，加密的，这样只有相似的接收者才有可能感知它们与身份相关的含义。在这里，我们基于身份信号在社会分类中的功能，提出了一种隐蔽信号的工具理论。我们认为，当信号传递者对陌生人慷慨时，当被发现不同的成本很高时，以及当仅与首选合作伙伴进行分类的能力受到限制时，隐蔽信号是受青睐的。我们进一步认为，隐蔽信号应该在“隐形”少数族裔成员中更常见，他们不太可能偶然遇到类似的人。我们用进化模型将这一理论形式化，以更严格地探索我们假设的后果。我们的结果对我们理解社会生活的许多方面都有影响，包括沟通、合作、社会认同、幽默、语用学、政治、仇恨言论和维持多样性。（PsycInfo 数据库记录 (c) 2021 APA，保留所有权利）