This paper provides experimental evidence on how monitoring intensity shapes the impact of leadership instruments like leading-by-example and punishment. The results show that, with low monitoring intensity, neither leading-by-example nor punishment increases cooperation if the leader can already send nonbinding signals about desired behavior. We identify two different reasons for this effect. Regarding leading-by-example, it is the cautiousness of the leader. Leaders are reluctant to recommend cooperative behavior and act accordingly, even though followers are particularly reciprocal in this context. Regarding punishment, it is the level of monitoring that matters. Monitoring of individual follower behavior increases the cooperation of leaders and followers across all treatments, but in particular, if the leader can punish uncooperative behavior. This result implies that monitoring in itself does not have a negative impact on the inclination to cooperate. It suggests that any motivational crowding out effect derives from a leader’s choice of monitoring, as it signals low trust in the followers. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications.

本文提供了关于监控强度如何影响领导工具（如以身作则和惩罚）的影响的实验证据。结果表明，在低监控强度下，如果领导者已经可以发送关于期望行为的非约束性信号，则无论是榜样还是惩罚都不会增加合作。我们确定了造成这种影响的两个不同原因。关于以身作则，就是领导者的谨慎。领导者不愿意推荐合作行为并采取相应行动，即使在这种情况下追随者特别互惠。关于惩罚，重要的是监控水平。对个体追随者行为的监控增加了领导者和追随者在所有治疗中的合作，但特别是如果领导者可以惩罚不合作的行为。这一结果意味着监测本身不会对合作倾向产生负面影响。这表明任何激励挤出效应都源于领导者对监督的选择，因为这表明对追随者的信任度较低。本文最后讨论了其影响。