Prominent research holds that the use of weapons of mass destruction is taboo. But how strong are these norms? Investigating this question among the mass public, we argue that some citizens actually support taboo policies in private but are unwilling to express counter-normative opinions openly due to fear of social sanction. These insincere norm-holders are difficult to identify empirically because they are observationally equivalent to sincere norm-holders in direct-question surveys. To overcome this challenge, we use a list design, which allows survey respondents to indirectly express sensitive opinions. The results from three list experiments show that between 10% and 17% of Americans falsify their preferences over chemical weapons use when asked directly. In an extension, we explore our framework in the realm of nuclear weapons and elite behavior. Our findings advance a specific debate on the strength of weapons taboos, while our conceptualization of insincere norm-holders and methodological application have broader implications for how scholars might think about and measure norms in international politics.

著名的研究认为，使用大规模杀伤性武器是禁忌。但这些规范有多强？在大众中调查这个问题，我们认为一些公民实际上私下支持禁忌政策，但由于害怕社会制裁而不愿公开表达反规范意见。这些不真诚的规范持有者很难凭经验识别，因为它们在观察上等同于直接问题调查中的真诚规范持有者。为了克服这一挑战，我们使用列表设计，允许调查受访者间接表达敏感意见。三个列表实验的结果表明，当被直接询问时，10% 到 17% 的美国人会伪造他们对使用化学武器的偏好。在扩展中，我们在核武器和精英行为领域探索我们的框架。我们的研究结果推动了关于武器禁忌力量的具体辩论，而我们对不真诚的规范持有者和方法论应用的概念化对学者们如何思考和衡量国际政治中的规范具有更广泛的影响。