This paper argues that the possibility of revealing counterfactuals of creaturely freedom to agents in possible worlds forming part of God’s natural knowledge poses a new problem for Molinism. This problem best comes to light when considering the phenomenon of stubbornness, i.e., the conscious refusal of fulfilling the providential plan revealed to and intended for us by another agent. The reason why this problem has gone unnoticed is that the usual instances of prophecy dealt with by Molinists (especially the story of Peter’s denial) are highly specific cases. These cases are special for three reasons: (1) because the content of the revelations does not include the relevant counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, (2) because the specific revelation plays no causal role in the immediate circumstances of the action that the agent is performing, and (3) because the agent is not intent on consciously refusing the providential plan intended by the relevant counterfactual. I explore possible worlds where one or more of these three conditions do not obtain and demonstrate the consequences these possible worlds have for Molinists.

本文认为，向构成上帝自然知识一部分的可能世界中的代理人揭示受造自由的反事实的可能性为莫林主义提出了一个新问题。考虑到顽固现象，即有意识地拒绝实现另一位代理人向我们透露并为我们准备的天意计划时，这个问题最能体现出来。之所以没有注意到这个问题，是因为莫林主义者处理的通常的预言事例（尤其是彼得否认的故事）是非常具体的事例。这些情况之所以特殊，有以下三个原因：（1）因为启示的内容不包括受造自由的相关反事实，（2）因为特定的启示在代理人正在执行的行动的直接环境中没有因果作用, (3) 因为代理人无意有意识地拒绝相关反事实所意图的天意计划。我探索了无法满足这三个条件中的一个或多个的可能世界，并展示了这些可能世界对莫林主义者的影响。