This paper studies the impact of lobbying on policies in a centrally managed water economy. First, we develop an optimal control model in which long-run water-management policies are an outcome of negotiation between policymakers and a politically organized farming sector. We show that under equilibrium conditions in the political game, larger political power of the farmers' lobby leads to faster exhaustion of naturally replenished water resources, and expedites the investment in water-supply backstop technologies such as desalination. Then, we employ a detailed hydro-economic model of Israel's water economy to assess the validity of claims by scientists and bureaucrats that lobbying by the local agricultural sector has contributed to the depletion of the country's natural freshwater resources and thus accelerated the development of seawater desalination. Specifically, we compare observed trajectories of water-management policies in the years 2000–2020 to their simulated counterparts, and find a better fit for simulated scenarios that involve lobbying than for a socially optimal one; this result prevails under simulated conditions of extreme water shortage due to faster population growth or lower recharge of natural water sources. The best-fitted political-equilibrium scenarios indicate considerable deadweight loss. We discuss potential causes of over- and undervaluation of the lobbying effect.

本文研究了游说对集中管理的水经济政策的影响。首先，我们开发了一个最优控制模型，在该模型中，长期水资源管理政策是决策者与政治上有组织的农业部门之间协商的结果。我们表明，在政治博弈的均衡条件下，农民游说团体的政治权力越大，自然补充的水资源枯竭越快，并加快了对海水淡化等供水后备技术的投资。然后，我们采用以色列水经济的详细水文经济模型来评估科学家和官僚声称当地农业部门游说导致该国水资源枯竭的说法的有效性。天然淡水资源，从而加速了海水淡化的发展。具体而言，我们将 2000 年至 2020 年间观察到的水管理政策轨迹与其模拟对应物进行了比较，并发现比社会最优方案更适合涉及游说的模拟场景；由于人口增长加快或天然水源补给量减少，这一结果在极端缺水的模拟条件下普遍存在。最适合的政治均衡情景表明可观的无谓损失。我们讨论了游说效应被高估和低估的潜在原因。并找到更适合涉及游说的模拟场景而不是社会最佳场景；由于人口增长加快或天然水源补给量减少，这一结果在极端缺水的模拟条件下普遍存在。最适合的政治均衡情景表明可观的无谓损失。我们讨论了游说效应被高估和低估的潜在原因。并找到更适合涉及游说的模拟场景而不是社会最佳场景；由于人口增长加快或天然水源补给量减少，这一结果在极端缺水的模拟条件下普遍存在。最适合的政治均衡情景表明可观的无谓损失。我们讨论了游说效应被高估和低估的潜在原因。