Reflectivists consider reflective reasoning crucial for good judgment and action. Anti-reflectivists deny that reflection delivers what reflectivists seek. Alas, the evidence is mixed. So, does reflection confer normative value or not? This paper argues for a middle way: reflection can confer normative value, but its ability to do this is bound by factors such as what we might call epistemic identity: an identity that involves particular beliefs—for example, religious and political identities. We may reflectively defend our identities’ beliefs rather than reflect open-mindedly to adopt whatever beliefs cohere with the best arguments and evidence. This bounded reflectivism is explicated with an algorithmic model of reflection synthesized from philosophy and science that yields testable predictions, psychometric implications, and realistic metaphilosophical suggestions—for example, overcoming motivated reflection may require embracing epistemic identity rather than veiling it (à la Rawls 1971). So bounded reflectivism should be preferred to views offering anything less.

中文翻译：

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有限的反思主义和认知认同

反思主义者认为反思推理对于良好的判断和行动至关重要。反反思主义者否认反思提供了反思主义者所寻求的东西。唉，证据好坏参半。那么，反思是否赋予规范价值？本文主张一种中间方式：反思可以赋予规范价值，但它这样做的能力受到诸如我们可能称之为认知身份的因素的约束：一种涉及特定信仰的身份——例如，宗教和政治身份。我们可能会反思性地捍卫我们身份的信念，而不是开放地反思以采用与最佳论据和证据相一致的任何信念。这种有限的反射主义用从哲学和科学合成的反思算法模型来解释，该模型产生可检验的预测、心理测量学的影响和现实的元哲学建议——例如，克服有动机的反思可能需要接受认知同一性而不是掩盖它（à la Rawls 1971）。因此，有界的反思主义应该比提供更少的观点更受欢迎。