This paper reviews the Roman tax collection system since the Late Republic to the Principality, focusing on the transition from the tax-farming system to a more centralized, census-based administration. We attempt to justify this transition according to New Institutional Economic theories (Transaction Cost Economics and Property Rights Theory). The paper argues that, during the Republic, the auction-based system of tax farming ended up giving place to opportunistic behaviors and abusing practices due to information asymmetries and contract incompleteness, enhanced by the collusion of tax farmers and governors. The Principality improved the efficiency of the tax collection system through the introduction of a bureaucratic and census-based administration, which allowed imperial employees to monitor the tax-farming activities.

本文回顾了自共和后期到公国以来的罗马税收制度，重点关注从税收-农业制度向更集中的、以人口普查为基础的行政管理的转变。我们试图根据新制度经济学理论（交易成本经济学和产权理论）来证明这种转变是合理的。该论文认为，在民国时期，由于信息不对称和合同不完整，以拍卖为基础的税收农业最终让位于机会主义行为和滥用行为，而税收农民和州长的勾结加剧了这种情况。公国通过引入官僚和基于人口普查的行政管理，提高了税收系统的效率，允许帝国雇员监督税收农业活动。