Lijphart’s claim that power-sharing spurs democratization in divided societies has strongly influenced ‘institutional engineering’ and is widely accepted among scholars despite the fact that empirical tests of its merits remain rare. This article revisits the democratic effect of power-sharing, arguing that it has two antagonist faces. On the positive side, it provides guarantees of inclusion to political elites, allowing them to commit to democratic rules. On the negative side, it also has an illiberal face, entailing limits on competition and individual rights. In this article, these contrary characteristics are traced back to two institutional types of power-sharing: a more flexible and open, liberal, type and a more rigid, corporate one. Using a novel dataset on power-sharing rules for 138 multi-ethnic countries and the period from 1945 to 2016, their respective democratic merits are tested. Conforming to theoretical expectations, the findings indicate that only liberal forms of power-sharing exhibit strong positive effects on democracy while corporate forms exert mixed or even negative ones. These findings are robust to a series of alternate model specifications and operationalizations as well as to instrumental variable approaches. In conclusion, the article indicates only a partial democratic effect of power-sharing, limited to its liberal subtype.

Lijphart 声称权力分享会在分裂的社会中促进民主化，这对“制度工程”产生了强烈的影响，并被学者们广泛接受，尽管对其优点的实证检验仍然很少见。本文重新审视了权力分享的民主效应，认为它有两个对立的面孔。从积极的方面来说，它为政治精英提供了包容性保证，使他们能够遵守民主规则。不利的一面是，它也有不自由的一面，意味着对竞争和个人权利的限制。在本文中，这些相反的特征可以追溯到两种权力分享的制度类型：一种更灵活、更开放、更自由的类型，一种更严格的公司类型。使用关于 138 个多民族国家和 1945 年至 2016 年期间的权力分享规则的新数据集，测试了它们各自的民主价值。与理论预期相符，研究结果表明，只有自由形式的权力分享对民主表现出强烈的积极影响，而公司形式则表现出混合甚至消极的影响。这些发现对于一系列替代模型规范和操作以及工具变量方法都是稳健的。总之，这篇文章指出了权力分享的部分民主效应，仅限于其自由派子类型。调查结果表明，只有自由形式的权力分享对民主表现出强烈的积极影响，而公司形式则表现出混合甚至消极的影响。这些发现对于一系列替代模型规范和操作以及工具变量方法都是稳健的。总之，这篇文章指出了权力分享的部分民主效应，仅限于其自由派子类型。调查结果表明，只有自由形式的权力分享对民主表现出强烈的积极影响，而公司形式则表现出混合甚至消极的影响。这些发现对于一系列替代模型规范和操作以及工具变量方法都是稳健的。总之，这篇文章指出了权力分享的部分民主效应，仅限于其自由派子类型。