Sub-federal units have emerged as increasingly important actors in international trade policy. This is puzzling as they usually have no formal competencies in this area. Using the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union as a case study, this article examines one key driver behind this development - the provisions in new free trade agreements. The article conceptualizes such provisions as instances of negative and positive integration. We show that while the Canadian provinces largely supported both types of provisions, sub-federal units in Belgium, Germany and Austria resisted unfettered liberalization through negative integration and market-creating positive integration. At the same time, they demanded stronger market-correcting positive integration measures. Three categories of sub-federal interests explain these differences in motivation. The Canadian province's engagement was motivated by (regional) economic interests, whereas bureaucratic self-interest and political interests mobilized sub-federal units in the European federations.

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解释贸易协定谈判中的次联邦差异：CETA 案例

次联邦单位已成为国际贸易政策中越来越重要的参与者。这令人费解，因为他们通常在这方面没有正式的能力。本文以加拿大与欧盟之间的全面经济贸易协定 (CETA) 为案例研究，探讨了这一发展背后的一个关键驱动因素——新自由贸易协定中的规定。该条将此类规定概念化为消极和积极整合的实例。我们表明，虽然加拿大各省在很大程度上支持这两种规定，但比利时、德国和奥地利的联邦下级单位通过消极一体化和创造市场的积极一体化抵制不受约束的自由化。同时，他们要求采取更强有力的市场修正积极整合措施。三类次联邦利益解释了这些动机上的差异。加拿大省的参与是由（区域）经济利益驱动的，而官僚的自身利益和政治利益则动员了欧洲联邦的次级联邦单位。