In the third volume of On What Matters, Derek Parfit argued that the distinction between imposing a newly created threat on someone and making what threatens some people instead threaten someone else has no genuine moral significance. This article's central thesis is that although there is much to learn from Parfit's arguments, they are ultimately unsuccessful at establishing that the redirected versus newly created threats distinction is morally irrelevant. In particular, I show that my Causal Sequences Principle specifies this distinction in such a way that it is immune to Parfit's objections against the Redirection Principle. It follows that any moral theory that can provide a sound rationale for the Causal Sequences Principle can solve the trolley problem.

中文翻译：

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创建和重定向威胁

在On What Matters的第三卷中，德里克·帕菲特 (Derek Parfit) 认为，将新创建的威胁强加于某人与使某些人受到威胁而不是威胁其他人之间的区别没有真正的道德意义。本文的中心论点是，尽管从 Parfit 的论点中可以学到很多东西，但他们最终未能成功地证明重定向威胁与新创建的威胁的区别在道德上是无关紧要的。特别是，我表明我的因果序列原则以这样一种方式指定了这种区别，即它不受帕菲特反对重定向原则的反对。因此，任何可以为因果顺序原则提供合理理由的道德理论可以解决电车问题。