There is an inconsistency between the access we have to our conscious lives and the Humean thesis of causal generalism. This was first drawn attention to by John Hawthorne, whose argument withstands a number of objections. Nevertheless, it has weaknessess. The first premise must be weakened if Humeans are to be compelled to accept it, and consequently, the second premise will have to be stronger to retain validity. I shore up the case against Humeanism by providing revised premises along with new defences of them. I show why this also provides a lesson for non-Humeans about the epistemology of causal relations.

中文翻译：

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为什么我不是休谟主义者

我们对有意识生活的访问与休谟的因果通证论题之间存在不一致。约翰霍桑首先注意到这一点，他的论点遭到了一些反对。然而，它也有弱点。如果要迫使休谟主义者接受第一个前提，则必须削弱第一个前提，因此，第二个前提必须更强才能保持有效性。我通过提供修改后的前提以及对它们的新辩护来支持反对休谟主义的案例。我展示了为什么这也为非休谟主义者提供了有关因果关系认识论的课程。