We develop screening models of final offer arbitration (FOA) in which the uninformed party makes a demand to the informed party. We consider models in which settlement occurs before and after the submission of binding offers, and in each we analyze costly discovery. Our results are compared to conventional arbitration (CA) which may be viewed as a litigation model. Overall, the incentive to invoke discovery is stronger in FOA than in CA, due in part, to informational rents often present in FOA, but not in CA. Moreover, submitted proposals under FOA contain information which raise the benefit of invoking discovery. FOA is a widely used procedure, including in the telecommunications industry.

我们开发最终报价仲裁 (FOA) 的筛选模型，其中不知情的一方向知情的一方提出要求。我们考虑了在提交绑定报价之前和之后进行结算的模型，并且在每个模型中我们都分析了代价高昂的发现。我们的结果与可被视为诉讼模式的传统仲裁 (CA) 进行了比较。总体而言，FOA 中调用发现的动机比 CA 更强，部分原因是 FOA 中经常存在信息租金，但 CA 中没有。此外，根据 FOA 提交的提案包含提高调用发现的好处的信息。FOA 是一种广泛使用的程序，包括在电信行业中。