In this paper, I discuss Kant’s concept-less schematism (KU, 5: 287) in the third Critique1 and make three claims: 1) concept-less schematism is entirely consistent with the schematism in the first Critique; 2) concept-less schematism is schematism with no empirical concept as an outcome; and 3) in accordance with 1) and 2), the imagination is free to synthesize the given manifold and leads to judgements of taste without this meaning either that the categories play no role at all or that these judgements are full-fledged cognitive determining judgements. While most commentators read the freedom of the imagination as its independence from the understanding, I argue that the freedom of the imagination is based on a non-determining employment of the pure concepts of the understanding. The freedom of the aesthetic imagination consists in the temporal schematization of the categories without any complementary determination of the empirical concept.

中文翻译：

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无概念图式：康德美学中想象与理解的互惠

在本文中，我讨论了康德的无概念图式主义（库, 5: 287) 在第三批判1并提出三个主张：1）无概念图式与第一个中的图式完全一致批判; 2）无概念的图式主义是没有概念的图式主义经验作为结果的概念；和 3) 根据 1) 和 2)，想象力可以自由地综合给定的流形，并导致品味判断，而这意味着类别根本不起作用，或者这些判断是成熟的认知决定判断. 虽然大多数评论家将想象的自由理解为独立于理解，但我认为想象的自由是基于对理解的纯粹概念的非确定性使用。审美想象的自由在于范畴的时间图式化，而没有经验概念的任何补充决定。