This paper calls into question the view typically attributed to Kant that aesthetic judgements are particularist, resisting all conceptual determination. Instead, it claims that Kant conceives of aesthetic judgements, particularly of art, as playing an important role in the revision of concepts: one sense in which aesthetic judgements, as Kant defines them, ‘find a universal’ for a given particular. To understand the relation between artistic judgements and concepts requires that we consider what I call Kant’s diachronic account of aesthetic ideas, or how such judgements unfold in the course of communication and reflection. My reading draws Kant much closer to debates in the philosophy of art on the semantic dimension of artworks. Here, illuminating the way in which aesthetic judgements about art can play a role in conceptual revision allows us to make sense of the way in which modern artworks contest concepts rather than merely presenting or expressing them.

中文翻译：

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论概念修正与审美判断

本文质疑通常归因于康德的观点，即审美判断是特殊主义的，抵制所有概念决定。相反，它声称康德认为审美判断，尤其是艺术判断，在修订概念：一种意义上的审美判断，正如康德定义的那样，为给定的特殊性“找到普遍性”。要理解艺术判断和概念之间的关系，我们需要考虑我所说的康德对审美观念的历时性说明，或者这种判断如何在交流和反思的过程中展开。我的阅读使康德更接近于艺术哲学中关于艺术品语义维度的辩论。在这里，阐明对艺术的审美判断如何在概念修正中发挥作用，使我们能够理解现代艺术作品与概念竞争的方式，而不仅仅是呈现或表达它们。