Despite being one of the founding members of the European Community and the third largest economy in the EU, Italy does not stand out as a particularly influential negotiator when it comes to day-to-day EU decision-making. Why is it that a country with Italy's political weight, economic resources and administrative capacity has such a patchy record in terms of negotiation success? Examining Italy's negotiation of two key EU policies (2008–16) and relying on an original set of interviews with EU officials and Italian politicians, this paper contends that the answer lies in a set of domestic factors that have largely been neglected by negotiation theory: namely, political, administrative and individual domestic constraints.

中文翻译：

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让你的房子在欧盟谈判中井井有条：当国内限制影响意大利在欧盟层面的表现时*

尽管意大利是欧洲共同体的创始成员之一和欧盟第三大经济体，但在欧盟的日常决策中，意大利并不是特别有影响力的谈判代表。为什么一个拥有意大利政治分量、经济资源和行政能力的国家在谈判成功方面的记录如此参差不齐？本文考察了意大利对两项关键欧盟政策（2008-16 年）的谈判，并依靠对欧盟官员和意大利政界人士的原始采访，认为答案在于一系列谈判理论在很大程度上忽略了的国内因素：即政治、行政和个人的国内限制。