This paper argues that the agent concerned to have accurate (outright) beliefs will have a consistent and multi-premise closed belief set, and not a (merely) single-premise closed and (merely) pairwise consistent belief set, as has often been thought. This argument rests on the fact that we need a notion of accuracy coherence for belief that is belief-sensitive; sensitive to one's perspective, in a way that the standard belief-insensitive notion of accuracy coherence is not. The choice of the belief-sensitive over belief-insensitive notion is defended, as is the choice of this particular belief-sensitive kind of accuracy coherence over other belief-sensitive rivals. Our conclusion is that accurate believers are deductively cogent.

中文翻译：

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准确的信徒具有演绎上的说服力

本文认为，有关具有准确（完全）信念的代理人将具有一致且多前提的封闭信念集，而不是（仅）单前提封闭和（仅）成对一致的信念集，正如人们通常认为的那样. 这个论点基于这样一个事实，即我们需要一个对信念敏感的信念的准确性连贯性概念；对一个人的观点敏感，在某种程度上，标准的信念不敏感的准确性一致性概念不是。选择对信念敏感而不是对信念不敏感的概念得到了辩护，就像选择这种特定的信念敏感类型的准确性连贯性而不是其他信念敏感的竞争对手一样。我们的结论是，准确的信徒在演绎上是有说服力的。