National governments have increasingly transferred enforcement powers to EU agencies that monitor and penalize non-compliance by private actors. How do EU agencies apply enforcement competences in practice? Based on the Eurolegalism thesis, pressures for deeper integration have led to the emergence of a more adversarial enforcement style in Europe. Consequently, supranational regulators are expected to employ formal and coercive enforcement instruments. Conversely, studies of EU enforcement suggest that EU agencies may be reluctant to antagonize national governments by prosecuting private actors. In this study, we analyze the enforcement practices of supranational agencies with direct enforcement powers: the EU Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and European Medicines Agency (EMA). We find that EU agencies apply a legalistic approach, but they vary in coerciveness of enforcement. Whereas EU agencies tend to apply more coercive measures against non-conform products, they are generally not adversarial toward non-compliant organizations.

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超国家监管机构如何让公司保持一致？欧盟机构执法方式分析

各国政府越来越多地将执法权移交给欧盟机构，以监督和惩罚私人行为者的违规行为。欧盟机构如何在实践中运用执法能力？基于欧洲法律主义的论点，深度整合的压力导致欧洲出现了更具对抗性的执法方式。因此，超国家监管机构应采用正式和强制性的执法工具。相反，对欧盟执法的研究表明，欧盟机构可能不愿意通过起诉私人行为者来对抗国家政府。在这项研究中，我们分析了具有直接执法权力的超国家机构的执法实践：欧盟航空安全局 (EASA)、欧洲证券和市场管理局 (ESMA) 和欧洲药品管理局 (EMA)。我们发现，欧盟机构采用了一种合法的方法，但它们的强制执行力各不相同。尽管欧盟机构倾向于对不合格产品采取更具强制性的措施，但它们通常不会与不合格的组织对抗。