This paper investigates the impact of chief financial officer (CFO) co-option on corporate tax avoidance. Using hand-collected data from a sample of nonfinancial listed firms included in the S&P350-Europe from 2013 to 2019, we find that firms with co-opted CFOs exhibit higher levels of tax avoidance. We also find that the board membership of co-opted CFOs moderates their propensity to engage in tax avoidance. These results introduce novel evidence about the role of CFOs in influencing firms’ levels of tax avoidance. They also shed light on the monitoring activity of the board of directors in the presence of board members who are also key decision-makers in tax strategies.

本文调查了首席财务官 (CFO) 共同选择对公司避税的影响。使用从 2013 年至 2019 年包含在标准普尔 350 指数-欧洲的非金融上市公司样本中手工收集的数据，我们发现拥有增聘 CFO 的公司表现出更高的避税水平。我们还发现，增选首席财务官的董事会成员会缓和他们从事避税的倾向。这些结果为首席财务官在影响公司避税水平方面的作用提供了新的证据。他们还阐明了董事会在董事会成员在场的情况下的监督活动，董事会成员也是税收战略的关键决策者。