The main aim of this article is to offer a systematic reconstruction of Husserl’s theory of minimal mind and his ideas pertaining to the lowest level of consciousness in living beings. In this context, the term ‘minimal mind’ refers to the mental sphere and capacities of the simplest conceivable subject. This topic is of significant contemporary interest for philosophy of mind and empirical research into the origins of consciousness. I contend that Husserl’s reflections on minimal mind offer a fruitful contribution to this ongoing debate. For Husserl, the embodied character of subjectivity, or consciousness, is essential for understanding minimal mind. In his view, there is an a priori necessary constitutive connection between the subjective and objective aspects of the body, between Leib and Körper, and this connection is especially important for exploring minimal mind from a phenomenological perspective. Thematically, the essay has three main parts. In Sect. 2, I present an overview of how minimal mind is framed in contemporary philosophy of mind and empirical research. I then analyse Husserl’s conception of embodiment with regard to the problem of minimal mind in Sect. 3. Finally, I present a more detailed investigation into Husserl’s account of minimal mind, highlighting features from his descriptions of animal mind and consciousness in early infancy (Sects. 4 and 5).

本文的主要目的是系统地重构胡塞尔的最低心灵理论及其有关生物最低意识水平的思想。在这种情况下，“最小心智”一词是指可想象的最简单主体的心智领域和能力。这个主题对于心灵哲学和意识起源的实证研究具有重要的当代意义。我认为胡塞尔对最低限度心灵的思考为这场正在进行的辩论做出了富有成果的贡献。对于胡塞尔来说，主体性或意识的具体特征对于理解最小心灵至关重要。在他看来，身体的主观与客观之间、莱布与科尔珀之间存在着先天必然的本构联系，而这种联系对于从现象学的角度探索极简心灵尤为重要。从主题上看，本文主要分为三个部分。昆虫。 2，我概述了当代心灵哲学和实证研究中如何构建最小心灵。然后我分析了胡塞尔在《教派》中关于最低限度心灵问题的体现概念。 3. 最后，我对胡塞尔对最小心智的描述进行了更详细的研究，重点介绍了他对婴儿早期动物心智和意识的描述的特征（第 4 节和第 5 节）。