Macro-economic policy coordination remains a challenge in the EU. The European Semester was designed to help facilitate more coordination. In the area of wage policies, it encourages Germany and the Netherlands to support stronger wage growth, while Italy and Portugal have been told to exercise wage restraint. This paper analyses how domestic interest group politics influence how EU recommendations are received. Reflecting on the different growth models that underpin these four countries, we find that country-specific recommendations meet country-specific obstacles – independent of whether recommendations aim at increasing or reducing wages. Specifically, we observe that domestic actors successfully mobilize against EU recommendations that go against the interests of their constituencies, but are less effective in mobilizing for recommendations aligning with their interests. Hence, we submit that high salience of EU influence poses an obstacle for EU-induced reform in the South while low salience limits EU influence in the North.

中文翻译：

---

南北欧洲学期：不同增长模式下的国内政治和欧盟引发的工资改革的显着性*

宏观经济政策协调仍然是欧盟面临的挑战。欧洲学期旨在帮助促进更多的协调。在工资政策方面，它鼓励德国和荷兰支持更强劲的工资增长，而意大利和葡萄牙则被告知要实行工资克制。本文分析了国内利益集团政治如何影响欧盟建议的接受方式。回顾支撑这四个国家的不同增长模式，我们发现针对特定国家/地区的建议会遇到针对特定国家/地区的障碍——与建议的目的是增加还是减少工资无关。具体来说，我们观察到国内行为者成功地动员起来反对违背其选民利益的欧盟建议，但在动员符合他们利益的建议方面效果较差。因此，我们认为欧盟影响力的高显着性对欧盟在南方引发的改革构成障碍，而低显着性限制了欧盟在北方的影响力。