Country-specific recommendations (CSRs) were introduced by the Stability and Growth Pact and offered guidance to countries in fiscal policies. Coordination was very limited and unsystematic in terms of policies and obligations. In the aftermath of the euro area financial crisis, the European Union reinforces the pre-existing policy cycle with the European Semester. Why do countries implement CSRs? Are there explanatory differences in their implementation before and after the introduction of the European Semester? We argue that the study of the entire history of the CSRs provides a unique chance to unravel opposite causal mechanisms. Employing an original dataset, we show that, in the first period, electoral proximity reduces implementation. We find also that, if a country is in (out of) the euro area, it is more (less) inclined to adhere to the CSRs as inflation increases. In the European Semester, instead, inflationary pressure and higher costs of enforcement increase implementation.

中文翻译：

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经济规则的实施：从稳定与增长公约到欧洲学期

《稳定与增长公约》提出了针对具体国家的建议（CSR），并为各国提供了财政政策指导。就政策和义务而言，协调非常有限且不系统。在欧元区金融危机之后，欧盟在欧洲学期强化了预先存在的政策周期。各国为什么要实施企业社会责任？在引入欧洲学期之前和之后，它们的实施是否存在解释性差异？我们认为，对企业社会责任整个历史的研究为解开相反的因果机制提供了一个独特的机会。使用原始数据集，我们表明，在第一阶段，选举接近度降低执行。我们还发现，如果一个国家在（脱离）欧元区，随着通货膨胀的增加，它更（更少）倾向于遵守 CSR。相反，在欧洲学期，通胀压力和更高的执法成本增加了执行力度。