ABSTRACT

In the game-theoretic literature on international conflict, risk-acceptance leads to war if it is severe enough to eliminate the bargaining range, in which case war occurs even under complete information. I analyze the effect of varying risk-propensities in incomplete-information crisis bargaining. In this setting, an additional lottery (beyond just the war lottery) is involved due to the proposer’s uncertainty about whether the proposal will be accepted. This has the effect that even small increases in either side’s willingness to take risks increase the probability of war, as opposed to the all-or-nothing, eliminating-the-bargaining-range mechanism. This result holds regardless of whether either side is risk-averse or risk-acceptant on the whole, and even if no bargaining range is being eliminated. I also show that uncertainty about the opponent’s risk-propensity can lead to war via a standard risk-return tradeoff, which is another way that risk-preferences can affect war and peace.

摘要

在有关国际冲突的博弈论文献中，如果风险接受程度足以消除讨价还价范围，那么风险接受就会导致战争，在这种情况下，即使在完全信息下也会发生战争。我分析了不同风险倾向在不完全信息危机谈判中的影响。在这种情况下，由于提议者不确定提议是否会被接受，因此涉及额外的彩票（不仅仅是战争彩票）。其效果是，即使任何一方冒险意愿的小幅增加也会增加战争的可能性，而不是全有或全无、消除谈判范围的机制。无论任何一方总体上是风险厌恶的还是风险接受的，即使没有讨价还价范围被消除，这个结果都成立。