In this paper, I argue that within Kantianism, widespread indifference of the global rich to the suffering of the global poor should be understood as resulting at least partly from vice. Kant had much more to say about vice than is often recognized, and it forms a crucial part of his moral anthropology. Kantians should thus attend to the ways in which vice functions as a practical obstacle to fulfilling duties of beneficence. In vice-fueled indifference, inclinations associated with self-love and self-conceit work their way into our wills, interfering with our moral commitments by impeding our ability to recognize moral requirements and our motivation to act on them. Vice distorts our reasoning in ways that promote self-deception and rationalization about the extent to which we are fulfilling moral demands. Kantian vice also has social dimensions. I argue that widespread indifference exacerbates our individual vices through social norms and practices that legitimize ignoring the needs of others. I conclude by offering some potential remedies to indifference within the Kantian framework.

在这篇论文中，我认为在康德主义中，全球富人对全球穷人的苦难普遍漠不关心，这应该被理解为至少部分是由恶习造成的。康德关于恶的要说的比人们通常认识到的要多得多，它构成了他的道德人类学的重要组成部分。因此，康德主义者应该注意恶习作为履行仁慈义务的实际障碍的方式。在恶习助长的冷漠中，与自爱和自负相关的倾向会渗透到我们的意志中，通过阻碍我们识别道德要求的能力和我们对这些要求采取行动的动力来干扰我们的道德承诺。罪恶以促进自我欺骗和合理化我们满足道德要求的程度的方式扭曲了我们的推理。康德的恶习也有社会层面。我认为，普遍的漠不关心会通过社会规范和实践使忽视他人的需求合法化，从而加剧了我们个人的恶习。最后，我对康德框架内的冷漠提供了一些潜在的补救措施。