Normative inferentialism is a semantic theory according to which the meaning of an expression is, or is determined by, its proper inferential role. Critics of inferentialism often argue that it violates the principle of compositionality, and that it is therefore unable to explain some important linguistic data. I have two tasks in this paper: the first is to demonstrate that inferentialism, appearances perhaps to the contrary, does not violate the principle of compositionality, and the second is to explain why this demonstration is unlikely to mollify critics of inferentialism. The dispute between inferentialists and their critics, I shall argue, is not about compositionality, it is a more fundamental dispute about the nature of representations.

规范推理主义是一种语义理论，根据该理论，表达式的含义是或由其适当的推理作用决定。推理主义的批评者经常争辩说它违反了组合原则，因此无法解释一些重要的语言数据。我在本文中两个任务：第一是证明inferentialism，外观或许与此相反，也不能违背组合原则，第二是解释为什么这个演示是不可能inferentialism的软化剂批评。我将争辩说，推理主义者和他们的批评者之间的争论不是关于组合性，而是关于表征本质的更根本的争论。