This article examines the effectiveness of grassroots lobbying at the regional level in Poland. For the purpose of the article, “loyalty to the citizens versus party theory” was formulated. It distinguishes two stages of the policy-making process within which the councilors react differently to grassroots lobbying. The first stage refers to the preparation of the law by the region’s board. The theory assumes that the more people pressure the legislator to persuade the board to their initiative, the more inclined he is to endorse it. This way he proves loyalty to the citizens and secures his reelection. The second stage concerns the legislators’ voting behavior. In this case, grassroots lobbying has a neutral impact on them. The councilors remain loyal to the party leaders and vote accordingly so that their position on the party list is guaranteed in the next election. In order to verify the theory, a study consisting of anonymous interviews with sixty legislators from the Opole and Subcarpathian Assembly was conducted. The outcome of the research indicates that (1) a considerable majority of legislators were positively influenced by grassroots lobbying to pressure the region’s board; (2) the voting behavior of the majority of legislators was not impacted by grassroots lobbying; (3) grassroots lobbying is the most effective at the first stage of the policy-making process; (4) the structure of government does not determine the legislators’ reaction to grassroots lobbying; (5) the party’s status (in power or in opposition) impacts the legislator’s voting behavior.

本文考察了波兰地区层面基层游说的有效性。为了文章的目的，制定了“忠于公民对党的理论”。它区分了决策过程的两个阶段，在这两个阶段中，议员对基层游说的反应不同。第一阶段是指由地区委员会制定法律。该理论假设，越多人向立法者施压以说服董事会支持他们的倡议，他就越倾向于支持它。通过这种方式，他证明了对公民的忠诚，并确保了他的连任。第二阶段涉及立法者的投票行为。在这种情况下，草根游说对他们的影响是中性的。议员仍然忠于党的领导人并相应地投票，以便在下次选举中保证他们在党的名单上的位置。为了验证该理论，进行了一项研究，其中包括对来自奥波莱和喀尔巴阡山脉议会的 60 名立法者的匿名采访。研究结果表明：（1）相当多的立法者受到基层游说对该地区董事会施压的积极影响；(2)大多数立法者的投票行为不受草根游说的影响；(3) 基层游说在决策过程的第一阶段最为有效；(4) 政府结构并不能决定立法者对基层游说的反应；(5) 政党的地位（执政或反对）影响立法者的投票行为。