A core assumption across many disciplines is that producers enter market exchange relationships for economic reasons. This research examines an overlooked factor, namely the socio-emotional benefits of selling the fruits of one’s labor. Specifically, the authors find that individuals selling their products interpret sales as a signal from the market, which serves as a source of self-validation, thus increasing their happiness above and beyond any monetary rewards from those sales. This effect highlights an information asymmetry that is opposite to that in traditional signaling theory. That is, the authors find that customers have information about the quality of products that they signal to the producer, validating the producer’s skill level. Further, the sales-as-signal effect is moderated by characteristics of the purchase transaction that determine the signal strength of sales: the effect is attenuated when product choice does not reflect a deliberate decision and is amplified when buyers incur higher monetary costs. In addition, sales have a stronger effect on happiness than alternative, non-monetary forms of market signals such as Likes. Finally, the sales-as-signal effect is more pronounced when individuals sell their self-made (vs. other-made) products and affects individuals’ happiness beyond the happiness gained from producing.

许多学科的核心假设是生产者出于经济原因进入市场交换关系。这项研究考察了一个被忽视的因素，即出售劳动成果的社会情感效益。具体来说，笔者发现，个人销售其产品销售解释从市场的信号，作为自我验证的来源，从而增加他们的幸福超越从这些销售中获得的任何金钱奖励。这种效应凸显了与传统信号理论相反的信息不对称。也就是说，作者发现客户有关于他们向生产商发出信号的产品质量信息，从而验证了生产商的技能水平。此外，作为信号的销售效应受到决定销售信号强度的购买交易特征的调节：当产品选择不反映深思熟虑的决定时，这种效应会减弱，而当买家承担更高的货币成本时，这种效应会被放大。此外，与其他非货币形式的市场信号（如“赞”）相比，销售对幸福感的影响更大。最后，当个人出售他们自制的产品时，销售作为信号的效应更为明显（相比之下）。