This article examines how leaders affect the implementation of peace agreements. It argues that implementation is more likely when leaders have publicly committed to peace because public commitments tie leaders’ hands, making it costly to back down from peaceful promises. This effect is hypothesized to hold even under conditions that make implementation costly: when implementing difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high, and when implementation is unreciprocated. These expectations are tested using novel data from the IPAD dataset on the implementation of peace agreements between 1989 and 2014 and on public statements by state and rebel leaders. Results show that governments and rebel groups whose leaders have publicly committed to peace are significantly more likely to make progress toward implementation. This effect holds for difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high, and when implementation is unreciprocated. These findings highlight the importance of leaders’ political will for successful implementation of peace agreements and sustainable peace.

本文探讨领导人如何影响和平协议的实施。它认为，当领导人公开承诺和平时，执行更有可能，因为公开承诺束缚了领导人的手，使得放弃和平承诺的代价高昂。假设即使在实施成本高昂的条件下，这种影响也会保持：当实施困难的条款时，当破坏者风险很高时，以及当实施没有回报时。这些预期是使用 IPAD 数据集中关于 1989 年至 2014 年和平协议执行情况以及国家和反叛领导人公开声明的新数据进行测试的。结果表明，领导人公开承诺和平的政府和反叛团体更有可能在实施方面取得进展。这种效果适用于困难的规定，当破坏者风险很高，并且实施没有回报时。这些调查结果强调了领导人的政治意愿对成功实施和平协议和可持续和平的重要性。