In two-dimensional semantics in the tradition of Davies and Humberstone, whether a singular term receives an epistemically shifted reading in the scope of a modal operator depends on whether the world considered as actual is shifted. This means that epistemically shifted readings should be available only in environments where an explicit contrast between the actual world and some counterfactual worlds cannot be made. In this paper, I argue that this is incorrect. Whether a singular term receives an epistemically shifted reading is independent of whether the world treated as actual is shifted. This, I argue, undermines the two-dimensionalist account of epistemic shift. I then turn to the question how a positive view should handle these two phenomena separately. I argue for treating singular terms with a version of counterpart theory in which the difference between epistemically shifted and other readings is determined in the context of utterance.

中文翻译：

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反事实认知场景

在戴维斯和亨伯斯通传统的二维语义学中，单数项是否在模态运算符的范围内接受认知上的移位阅读取决于被视为现实的世界是否发生了移位。这意味着只有在无法在现实世界和一些反事实世界之间进行明确对比的环境中，才应该进行认知转变的阅读。在本文中，我认为这是不正确的。单数项是否接受认知上的转变阅读与被视为现实的世界是否发生转变无关。我认为，这破坏了二维论对认知转变的解释。然后我转向积极的观点应该如何分别处理这两种现象的问题。