As state-sponsored cyber operations have proliferated, some states are outsourcing these operations to non-state cyber proxies. However, given the relative ease of outsourcing cyber operations, it is puzzling why more states are not engaged in this practice. I examine how domestic accountability institutions potentially explain this restraint in the use of cyber proxies. I argue that in cases where the incumbent is likely to be held to account for cyber operations, there is restraint in the use of proxies. Moreover, I distinguish vertical from horizontal accountability and argue that because vertical accountability mechanisms directly threaten the tenure of the incumbent if outsourced cyber operations go wrong, it has a greater constraining effect relative to horizontal accountability. I test these propositions with new data on the activities of several hacker groups and robustly confirm that accountability institutions do place significant constraints on the use of cyber proxies.

随着国家支持的网络行动激增，一些州将这些行动外包给非国家网络代理。然而，鉴于外包网络操作相对容易，令人费解的是为什么更多的国家没有参与这种做法。我研究了国内问责机构如何潜在地解释这种使用网络代理的限制。我认为，在现任者可能需要为网络操作负责的情况下，代理的使用是有限制的。此外，我将纵向问责制与横向问责制区分开来，并认为如果外包网络运营出现问题，纵向问责机制会直接威胁到现任者的任期，因此相对于横向问责制，它具有更大的约束作用。