ABSTRACT

The UK policy response to Covid-19 illustrates the problems arising where (1) a central government faces few countervailing political pressures as in Westminster systems; (2) the design of intergovernmental relations (IGR) mechanisms of coordination and conflict resolution fails to cope with the realities of a severely, asymmetric devolution settlement; and (3) local government faces serious collective action problems in influencing and mobilising resistance to a dominant central government. Firstly, the UK policy response illustrates the UK core executive’s serious problems in governing strategically and coordinating services across entrenched departmental and multi-level boundariesdespite government ministers enjoying a largely unchecked capacity to initiate major departmental reorganisations with significant IGR implications. Secondly, Westminster ministers resisted pressure from the three UK devolved nations and English city-region mayors to rebalance UK and English IGR mechanisms. Thirdly, the central response illustrates how the UK government, as the ‘English’ central government, maintained its control of local government through financial controls and outsourcing services.

摘要

英国对 Covid-19 的政策反应说明了在以下情况下出现的问题：(1) 中央政府几乎没有像威斯敏斯特系统那样面临反制的政治压力；(2) 政府间关系 (IGR) 协调和冲突解决机制的设计未能应对严重、不对称的权力下放解决的现实；(3) 地方政府在影响和动员对占主导地位的中央政府的抵抗方面面临严重的集体行动问题。首先，英国的政策反应表明，尽管政府部长在启动具有重大 IGR 影响的重大部门重组方面基本上不受限制，但英国核心执行官在战略性管理和跨根深蒂固的部门和多层次边界协调服务方面存在严重问题。第二，威斯敏斯特的部长们顶住了来自英国三个权力下放国家和英国城市地区市长的压力，要求重新平衡英国和英国的 IGR 机制。第三，中央的回应说明了英国政府作为“英国”中央政府如何通过金融控制和外包服务来维持对地方政府的控制。