ABSTRACT

Weak incentives to invest in shareholder oversight and limited resources confine stewardship by large institutional investors. According to an influential argument, activist shareholders can offer a solution by supplying large investment (asset) managers with company-specific information. This article questions the potential informational role of traditional activist campaigns initiated by hedge funds – the most prominent group of activist shareholders – for the purposes of stewardship by large institutional investors by showing that these two groups of shareholders have different visions of stewardship with little scope for interactions. Consistent with this argument, data from the FTSE 350 companies, the UK's largest listed firms, show that associations between activist demands and the voting behaviour of top investment managers vary based on activist types and demand topics. Demands initiated by hedge funds and on business and operating matters receive less support. These findings have important implications for shareholder stewardship and for corporate law reform.

摘要

投资于股东监督的动力不足和有限的资源限制了大型机构投资者的管理。根据一个有影响力的论点，激进股东可以通过向大型投资（资产）经理提供公司特定信息来提供解决方案。本文质疑由对冲基金（最突出的激进股东群体）发起的传统激进运动的潜在信息作用，通过表明这两组股东对管理有不同的看法，几乎没有空间，以供大型机构投资者管理。互动。与这一论点一致，来自英国最大的上市公司 FTSE 350 公司的数据，表明激进主义需求与顶级投资经理的投票行为之间的关联因激进主义类型和需求主题而异。对冲基金发起的关于业务和运营事务的需求得到的支持较少。这些发现对股东管理和公司法改革具有重要意义。