In this paper, we develop a neo-Humean response to the problem of moral inclusion by bringing Humean moral philosophy into deep and serious dialogue with Latin American philosophy. Our argument for achieving this two-fold aim unfolds as follows. In section one, we elucidate Mia Sosa-Provencio’s conception of a mestiza ethics of care. We begin by highlighting its fundamental elements, especially its concern with what we refer to as the cultural embeddedness both of moral agents and of moral patients. We then explain how this aspect of the mestiza ethic poses a distinctive challenge for Humean moral philosophy. In section two, we develop a neo-Humean response to this challenge. We begin by highlighting the strengths and limits of trying to develop a response by appealing to Hume’s conceptions of sympathy and humanity. We then present what we take to be the most plausible way for a neo-Humean conception of moral philosophy to offer a satisfactory reply to the challenge posed by the mestiza ethics of care, by appealing to two key concepts from outside the system of Hume’s moral philosophy: namely, sympathetic understanding and relational humility.

在本文中，我们通过将休谟道德哲学与拉丁美洲哲学进行深入而严肃的对话，对道德包容问题提出了新休谟主义的回应。我们实现这一双重目标的论点如下展开。在第一节中，我们阐明了 Mia Sosa-Provencio 的 mestiza 护理伦理概念。我们首先强调它的基本要素，特别是它对我们所说的文化嵌入性的关注道德代理人和道德患者。然后我们解释了混血儿伦理的这一方面如何对休谟道德哲学提出了独特的挑战。在第二节中，我们针对这一挑战制定了新休谟主义的回应。我们首先通过诉诸休谟的同情和人性概念来强调试图做出回应的优势和局限性。然后，我们通过诉诸休谟道德体系之外的两个关键概念，展示了我们认为新休谟主义道德哲学概念最合理的方式，以对 mestiza 关怀伦理提出的挑战提供满意的答复。哲学：即同情的理解和关系的谦逊。