Abstract

The 2008 financial crisis saw central banks introduce a variety of tools to shore up the financial system, including unconventional measures that made use of central bank balance sheets to directly shape markets. This paper argues that central banks increasingly rely on unconventional tools in noncrisis times to maintain confidence in an unstable financial system: in rich countries, outright asset purchase programs form the core of monetary policy, and in emerging capitalist economies, the sale and purchase of foreign exchange assets constitute the central mechanism of exchange rate policy. These interventions increasingly target ‘market dysfunction,’ as opposed to (a narrow interpretation of) monetary policy or the level of the exchange rate, suggesting a convergence in central bank operations around maintaining the plumbing of finance. Using two case studies – foreign exchange operations by the Reserve Bank of India and asset purchase programs by the U.S. Federal Reserve – the paper demonstrates a blurring of the boundaries between crisis and noncrisis interventions, and lends evidence to the concept of a de-risking state that guarantees liquidity. The paper concludes with a discussion of how a de-risking state exacerbates inequality, financial vulnerabilities and undermines meaningful action on pressing issues such as climate change.

摘要

2008 年金融危机期间，各国央行推出了多种工具来支撑金融体系，包括利用央行资产负债表直接塑造市场的非常规措施。本文认为，中央银行在非危机时期越来越依赖非常规工具来维持对不稳定金融体系的信心：在富裕国家，直接资产购买计划构成货币政策的核心，而在新兴资本主义经济体，买卖外国资产外汇资产构成汇率政策的核心机制。这些干预措施越来越多地针对“市场功能失调”，而不是（对货币政策的狭义解释）或汇率水平，这表明中央银行围绕维持金融管道的操作趋同。通过两个案例研究——印度储备银行的外汇操作和美联储的资产购买计划——本文证明了危机和非危机干预之间界限的模糊，并为去风险状态的概念提供了证据保证流动性。本文最后讨论了去风险化国家如何加剧不平等、金融脆弱性并破坏对气候变化等紧迫问题采取有意义的行动。