Philosophers disagree about whether outcome luck can affect an agent's “moral responsibility.” Focusing on responsibility's “negative side,” some maintain, and others deny, that an action's results bear constitutively on how “blameworthy” the actor is, and on how much blame or punishment they “deserve.” Crucially, both sides to the debate assume that an actor's blameworthiness and negative desert are equally affected—or unaffected—by an action's results. This article challenges that previously overlooked assumption, arguing that blameworthiness and desert are distinct moral notions that serve distinct normative functions: blameworthiness serves a liability function (removing a bar to otherwise impermissible treatments), whereas desert serves a favoring function (contributing new value to states of affairs, or providing new reasons for responsive treatments). Having distinguished (negative) desert from blameworthiness, the article proposes a novel resolution to the outcome-luck debate: that results do not affect an agent's liability to blame, but do affect the amount and severity of blame to which the agent is justly liable, including by affecting the severity of blame that the agent deserves.

中文翻译：

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应责、应得和运气

对于结果运气是否会影响代理人的“道德责任”，哲学家们意见不一。着眼于责任的“消极面”，一些人坚持，而另一些人则否认，行动的结果在结构上取决于行为者的“应受谴责”程度，以及他们“应得的”谴责或惩罚的程度。至关重要的是，辩论的双方都假设行为者的应责性和负面应得同样受到行动结果的影响——或不受其影响。本文挑战了以前被忽视的假设，认为应责和应得是不同的道德概念，具有不同的规范功能：应责具有责任功能（消除对其他不允许的治疗的障碍），而应得则有利于功能（为事态提供新的价值，或为响应性治疗提供新的理由）。将（负面）应得与可责备区分开来后，本文针对结果运气辩论提出了一个新颖的解决方案：结果不会影响代理人的责备责任，但会影响代理人应承担的责备的数量和严重程度，包括通过影响代理人应得的责备的严重程度。