Why do some immigrant groups succeed in influencing the U.S. government to impose economic sanctions on their former dictators, while others do not? This paper begins by noting that the president is the pivotal player in sanctions policy and that presidents cater to voters in swing states. Therefore, a diaspora’s proportion of the swing-state electorate should determine whether the American government imposes sanctions on their former homeland. Considering dictatorships from 1946 to 2005, this paper finds that a one-percentage-point increase in the diaspora’s proportion of the swing-state electorate increases the probability of regime-change sanctions by 11 percentage points. It then calculates causal estimates of the effectiveness of these sanctions on regime change. Using the diaspora’s proportion of the swing-state electorate as an instrumental variable for the presence of economic sanctions, it finds that sanctions do not have a positive, statistically-significant impact on regime change while a negative impact is plausible.

为什么一些移民团体能够成功地影响美国政府对其前独裁者实施经济制裁，而另一些却没有？本文首先指出总统是制裁政策的关键参与者，总统迎合摇摆州的选民。因此，侨民在摇摆州选民中的比例应该决定美国政府是否对他们的故乡实施制裁。考虑到 1946 年至 2005 年的独裁统治，本文发现，侨民在摇摆州选民中的比例每增加 1 个百分点，政权更迭制裁的可能性就会增加 11 个百分点。然后计算这些制裁对政权更迭的有效性的因果估计。