Regulatory interventions aimed at promoting competition in digital markets face a challenge: How to design remedies that actually improve welfare? This article helps provide an answer to this question. First, it maps out the frontier of remedy design: Part II.A summarizes antitrust and regulatory remedies imposed on digital companies over the past decades, while Part II.B reviews nineteen reports on competition in digital markets to identify proposals to advance antitrust or regulatory interventions. Part III, the core of the article, builds on this review to propose a new, two-level framework for remedy design that integrates pro-competition antitrust and regulatory interventions as part of a single policy. First, at the substantive level, it develops a compounded error-cost framework that helps authorities to choose between different remedies applicableto a given conduct: when policymakers accept higher risks of over-enforcement in deciding to intervene, they should compensate by taking lower risks of over-enforcement in remedy design and vice-versa. Second, at the institutional level, the article proposes that authorities consider separating three connected but different key activities in remedy design: (i) identifying harmful behavior, (ii) designing interventions, and (iii) monitoring and adapting remedies. It also outlines four criteria (legal mandate, need for technical expertise, relative risks of regulatory capture, and overall administrative costs) that can help authorities allocate these tasks among different regulators. Part IV concludes by applying this framework to seven types of conduct that Part II identified as potentially problematic: (i) discrimination, unfair treatment, and self-preferencing; (ii) exclusivity contracts; (iii) tying or bundling; (iv) MFNs and other price parity clauses; (v) refusals to deal, limited interoperability, and lack of data portability; (vi) exploitative or exclusionary terms of service; and (vii) nudges, sludges, and other concerns around user interfaces.

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为数字市场设计补救措施：反垄断与监管之间的相互作用

旨在促进数字市场竞争的监管干预面临挑战：如何设计能够真正改善福利的补救措施？本文有助于为这个问题提供答案。首先，它勾勒出补救设计的前沿：第二部分 A 总结了过去几十年对数字公司实施的反垄断和监管补救措施，而第二部分 B 审查了 19 份关于数字市场竞争的报告，以确定推进反垄断或监管的建议干预。第三部分是本文的核心，在此审查的基础上提出了一个新的两级补救设计框架，将促进竞争的反垄断和监管干预整合为单一政策的一部分。首先，在实质性层面，它开发了一个复合错误成本框架，帮助当局在适用于特定行为的不同补救措施之间进行选择：当决策者在决定干预时接受过度执法的较高风险时，他们应该通过在补救设计中承担较低的过度执法风险来进行补偿，以及反之亦然。其次，在制度层面，文章建议当局考虑在补救设计中将三个相互关联但不同的关键活动分开：（i）识别有害行为，（ii）设计干预措施，以及（iii）监测和调整补救措施。它还概述了可以帮助当局在不同监管机构之间分配这些任务的四个标准（法律授权、对技术专业知识的需求、监管捕获的相对风险和总体管理成本）。第四部分最后将这一框架应用于第二部分认为可能存在问题的七类行为：(i) 歧视、不公平待遇和自我偏好；(ii) 独家合同；(iii) 搭售或捆绑；(iv) 最惠国待遇和其他价格平价条款；(v) 拒绝交易、有限的互操作性和缺乏数据可移植性；(vi) 剥削性或排他性的服务条款；(vii) 用户界面的轻推、污泥和其他问题。