How do the rule of law and political representation relate to each other? I answer this question, hitherto neglected by rule-of-law scholars, taking my cue from Joseph Raz’s revision of his conception of the rule of law and by relying on a distinction between preferences and interests, which pervades discussions of political representation. I argue that political representatives’ attention to their constituents’ preferences, and not just their interests, is a necessary feature of a conception of representation that expresses a robust allegiance to the rule of law. More specifically, that such allegiance is better honoured when representatives are responsive to preferences warranted by public interests. I offer two groups of rule-of-law reasons for that claim. First, because respect for preferences by representatives facilitates the conditions for the law to be obeyed. Second, respect for those preferences through the justification of the representatives’ collective decisions allows for accountability and for non-arbitrary creation and application of the law. I finish addressing a threefold objection to my reliance on preferences as objects that representatives should consider when making their decisions.

法治和政治代表如何相互关联？我从约瑟夫·拉兹 (Joseph Raz) 对其法治概念的修订中汲取灵感，并依靠偏好和利益之间的区别来回答这个迄今为止被法治学者忽视的问题，这种区别在政治代表的讨论中无处不在。我认为，政治代表对选民偏好的关注，而不仅仅是他们的利益，是表达对法治的坚定忠诚的代表概念的必要特征。更具体地说，当代表对公共利益所保证的偏好做出回应时，这种忠诚会得到更好的尊重。我为这种说法提供了两组法治理由。第一的，因为尊重代表的偏好有助于为遵守法律创造条件。其次，通过代表集体决定的正当性来尊重这些偏好，允许问责制和非武断地制定和适用法律。我完成了对我依赖偏好作为代表在做出决定时应该考虑的对象的三重反对意见。