The past few years have witnessed a growing interest among scholars and policy-makers in the interplay of international bureaucracies with civil society organizations, other non-profit entities, and the private sector. This article extends the state of research by investigating whether and how secretariats try to strengthen their reputation within their respective policy regimes through information provision and alliance building. Based on reputation theory, the article argues that ties cultivated with stakeholders as well as appearance and presentation of information are decisive in this regard. Methodologically, the study implements a mixed-methods design that combines a quantitative survey with social network analysis and qualitative content analysis of interviews with stakeholders within the climate and biodiversity regime. We show that the secretariats of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) maintain relationships with a wide range of state and non-state actors to enhance their reputation. Moreover, different types of actors receive different types of information from the two secretariats studied. Our findings reveal that both secretariats use their limited resources for investing strategically into networks with different types of actors (in the broader transnational policy network), either via the tailored provision of information or through strategic networking with multipliers. They also indicate that reputation does not simply depend on characteristics of bureaucracies, but also on framework conditions and different communication strategies.

过去几年，学者和政策制定者对国际官僚机构与民间社会组织、其他非营利实体和私营部门的相互作用越来越感兴趣。本文通过调查秘书处是否以及如何通过提供信息和建立联盟来增强其在各自政策制度中的声誉，从而扩展了研究状态。基于声誉理论，本文认为与利益相关者培养的联系以及信息的出现和呈现在这方面具有决定性作用。在方法论上，该研究采用混合方法设计，将定量调查与社会网络分析以及与气候和生物多样性制度内利益相关者访谈的定性内容分析相结合。我们表明，生物多样性公约 (CBD) 和联合国气候变化框架公约 (UNFCCC) 的秘书处与广泛的国家和非国家行为者保持关系，以提高他们的声誉。此外，不同类型的行为者从所研究的两个秘书处收到不同类型的信息。我们的调查结果表明，两个秘书处都利用其有限的资源，通过量身定制的信息提供或通过与乘数的战略网络，对不同类型的参与者（在更广泛的跨国政策网络中）进行战略投资。他们还表明，声誉不仅取决于官僚机构的特征，还取决于框架条件和不同的传播策略。