The article focuses on the relationship between technocracy and populism during the first year of the COVID-19 crisis. On one hand, this relationship has been defined by populist denial, displacement of crisis, and rejection of the technocratic consensus on the need for urgent and decisive action in the face of the global pandemic. On the other hand, COVID-19 has also led to convergence between the two sides and populist approximation to technocracy more akin to ‘technopopulist’ compromises and politics. The article shows that this pattern of antagonism and approximation has been shaped by three constitutive features of the state of exception and emergency during the COVID-19 crisis: (1) discursive securitization of the threat, (2) the use of extraordinary tools and measures under the licence of precautionary principle, and (3) institutional concentration of power. While COVID-19 is an extreme case in all three respects, the lessons learned from the pandemic advance our general understanding of technocracy and populism as constitutive features of contemporary politics.

本文重点讨论了 COVID-19 危机第一年技术官僚主义与民粹主义之间的关系。一方面，这种关系的定义是民粹主义的否认、危机的转移以及技术官僚共识的拒绝，即在全球大流行面前需要采取紧急和果断行动的必要性。另一方面，COVID-19 也导致双方趋同，民粹主义接近技术官僚主义，更类似于“技术民粹主义”妥协和政治。文章表明，这种对抗和近似的模式是由 COVID-19 危机期间异常和紧急状态的三个构成特征塑造的：（1）威胁的话语安全化，（2）使用非凡的工具和措施根据预防原则的许可，(3) 权力的制度集中。尽管 COVID-19 在所有三个方面都是一个极端案例，但从大流行中吸取的教训促进了我们对技术官僚主义和民粹主义作为当代政治构成特征的普遍理解。