There are at least two ways to argue for the view that the outcome of one’s actions does not affect one’s blameworthiness. The first way appeals to the ‘Control Principle’ while the second way relies on what it means to be blameworthy. The focus of this paper is on a recent attempt at pursuing this second way that relies on an account of blameworthiness dubbed the ‘Engagement View’. This paper argues, however, that the Engagement View alone is insufficient to show why the outcomes of one’s actions does not affect one’s blameworthiness. It argues that if blame is understood more robustly as involving reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation, then it turns out the Engagement View can also give us reasons for the contrary view. This paper ends by drawing out some general implications that this has on our understanding of blameworthiness.

至少有两种方法可以论证一个人行为的结果不会影响一个人的应受谴责性的观点。第一种方式诉诸“控制原则”，而第二种方式则依赖于应受指责的含义。本文的重点是最近对第二种方式的尝试，该方式依赖于被称为“参与观点”的应受指责性解释。然而，本文认为，仅凭参与观不足以说明为什么一个人的行为结果不会影响一个人的应受谴责性。它认为，如果责备被更强有力地理解为涉及诸如怨恨和愤慨等反应性态度，那么事实证明，参与观点也可以为我们提供相反观点的理由。这篇论文最后勾勒出这对我们理解可指责性的一些普遍影响。