Some have argued that online intermediaries facilitate sales of counterfeit and fake products. This study investigates the association between anti-counterfeit efforts and the revenue models implemented by intermediaries. We build a stylized analytical model to investigate the conditions under which either the advertising model or the brokerage model would lead to a higher anti-counterfeit effort. We find the intensity of market competition plays a critical role in the intermediary’s decisions on anti-counterfeit effort. Specifically, when market competition is less intense, we show that the intermediary has a greater economic incentive to combat counterfeit selling in the brokerage model than in the advertising model. We supplement empirical support to the results. In particular, using a composite score, we find the intermediary that adopts the advertising model tends to have a lower composite score than one using the brokerage model. Our results suggest the focusing on anti-counterfeit measures is more a means rather than an ends in combating counterfeit sales and the policymakers should pay more attention to the impacts from the adopted revenue model.

一些人认为，在线中介促进了假冒和假冒产品的销售。本研究调查了反假冒工作与中介机构实施的收入模式之间的关联。我们构建了一个程式化的分析模型来调查广告模型或经纪模型会导致更高的防伪工作的条件。我们发现，市场竞争的激烈程度对中介机构的打假决策起着至关重要的作用。具体而言，当市场竞争不那么激烈时，我们表明中间商在经纪模式中比在广告模式中具有更大的经济激励来打击假冒销售。我们补充了对结果的实证支持。特别是，使用综合得分，我们发现采用广告模式的中介的综合得分往往低于使用经纪模式的中介。我们的研究结果表明，在打击假冒销售方面，关注打假措施更多是一种手段而不是目的，政策制定者应该更加关注所采用的收入模式的影响。