This paper explores how reciprocity concerns of potential accident victims influence potential injurers’ precautions before an accident and victims’ settlement behavior after an accident. In our framework, a strictly liable injurer privately informed about the probability of losing in trial chooses either high or low care and, in the event of an accident, the victim demands a settlement amount from the injurer. We find that victims’ intention-based reciprocity concerns tend to increase both the level of precautions and the likelihood of trial and that the impact of reciprocity concerns on equilibrium outcomes depends on the legal cost allocation rule.

中文翻译：

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事故避免和和解谈判：互惠的作用

本文探讨了潜在事故受害者的互惠关切如何影响潜在加害者在事故前的预防措施和事故后受害者的和解行为。在我们的框架中，一个严格负责的加害者私下知道在审判中败诉的可能性，选择高度关注或低关注度，并且在发生事故时，受害者要求加害者支付和解金额。我们发现受害者基于意图的互惠问题往往会增加预防措施的水平和审判的可能性，并且互惠问题对均衡结果的影响取决于法律成本分配规则。