This article presents a novel measurement and analysis of electromagnetic (EM) information leakage from printed circuit board (PCB) power delivery network (PDN) of cryptographic devices. We propose an accurate EM information leakage analysis method based on a correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA) considering advanced encryption standard (AES) operation cycles and clock frequency. We measure field distribution on the PCB level AES core PDN and conduct the proposed analysis method to derive the information leakage maps. For the first time, we verified that the EM information leakage depends on the intensity of dominant field distribution on the PCB PDN using the proposed method. We validated that the whole secret key information can be extracted from locations in the PCB PDN distant from the cryptographic integrated circuit where a specific field is dominant due to the physical structure of the PCB PDN. Based on the measurement and analysis results, we discuss an efficient EM information leakage evaluation method based on the dominant field radiation. We evaluate the EM information leakage from the decoupling capacitor in the backside of the PCB. Finally, we propose a design methodology to suppress the EM information leakage from the PCB PDN.

中文翻译：

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密码设备印刷电路板供电网络电磁信息泄漏的测量与分析


本文提出了一种针对加密设备印刷电路板 (PCB) 供电网络 (PDN) 电磁 (EM) 信息泄漏的新颖测量和分析方法。我们提出了一种基于相关电磁分析（CEMA）并考虑高级加密标准（AES）操作周期和时钟频率的准确电磁信息泄漏分析方法。我们测量 PCB 级 AES 核心 PDN 上的场分布，并采用所提出的分析方法来导出信息泄漏图。我们首次使用所提出的方法验证了电磁信息泄漏取决于 PCB PDN 上主场分布的强度。我们验证了整个秘密密钥信息可以从 PCB PDN 中远离密码集成电路的位置提取，其中由于 PCB PDN 的物理结构，特定字段占主导地位。基于测量和分析结果，我们讨论了一种基于主导场辐射的高效电磁信息泄漏评估方法。我们评估 PCB 背面去耦电容器的电磁信息泄漏。最后，我们提出了一种抑制 PCB PDN 中 EM 信息泄漏的设计方法。