Due to the importance of reliability and security in dc microgrids, it is essential to provide maximum resilience against cyberattacks. However, insufficient global information in the microgrid makes it difficult to accurately identify the location of these attacks. To address these issues, this article develops a novel resilient distributed control mechanism, which ensures average voltage regulation and proportional load sharing in dc microgrids under unknown cyberattacks. The proposed resilient control design does not require any information regarding the nature or location of the attacks. By virtue of a graph theoretical approach and a Lyapunov-based framework, the proposed resilient distributed control strategy is designed in a way such that the system stability is always guaranteed following a comprehensive design mechanism. Finally, the robustness of the proposed resilient distributed control approach is demonstrated via simulations and validated by experimental results.

中文翻译：

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协同直流微电网网络攻击弹性控制器的面向稳定性设计

由于直流微电网可靠性和安全性的重要性，因此必须提供针对网络攻击的最大弹性。然而，微电网中的全局信息不足，难以准确识别这些攻击的位置。为了解决这些问题，本文开发了一种新颖的弹性分布式控制机制，可确保在未知网络攻击下直流微电网中的平均电压调节和比例负载分配。提议的弹性控制设计不需要任何有关攻击性质或位置的信息。凭借图论方法和基于李雅普诺夫的框架，所提出的弹性分布式控制策略的设计方式使得系统稳定性始终遵循综合设计机制得到保证。最后，