Due to the importance of reliability and security in dc microgrids, it is essential to provide maximum resilience against cyberattacks. However, insufficient global information in the microgrid makes it difficult to accurately identify the location of these attacks. To address these issues, this article develops a novel resilient distributed control mechanism, which ensures average voltage regulation and proportional load sharing in dc microgrids under unknown cyberattacks. The proposed resilient control design does not require any information regarding the nature or location of the attacks. By virtue of a graph theoretical approach and a Lyapunov-based framework, the proposed resilient distributed control strategy is designed in a way such that the system stability is always guaranteed following a comprehensive design mechanism. Finally, the robustness of the proposed resilient distributed control approach is demonstrated via simulations and validated by experimental results.

中文翻译：

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面向协作直流微电网的网络攻击弹性控制器的稳定性设计


由于直流微电网的可靠性和安全性非常重要，因此必须提供最大程度的抵御网络攻击的能力。然而，微电网中全局信息不足，导致难以准确识别这些攻击的位置。为了解决这些问题，本文开发了一种新颖的弹性分布式控制机制，可确保在未知网络攻击下直流微电网的平均电压调节和比例负载分配。所提出的弹性控制设计不需要任何有关攻击的性质或位置的信息。凭借图论方法和基于李雅普诺夫的框架，所提出的弹性分布式控制策略的设计方式使得系统稳定性始终能够通过综合设计机制得到保证。最后，通过仿真证明了所提出的弹性分布式控制方法的鲁棒性，并通过实验结果进行了验证。