David Lewis’s attempt to defuse grandfather paradoxes consistently without special restrictions on the ability of time travelers to act in the past is controversial. Kadri Vihvelin uses the case of possible autoinfanticide—killing one’s infant self—to argue on Lewisian grounds that Lewis is wrong, since all counterfactual attempts at autoinfanticide would fail. I present a new defense of Lewis against Vihvelin premised on the possibility of personal reinstatement, where a person who dies prematurely is replicated from information collected from a previous live scan. I argue on Lewisian grounds that in a Vihvelin case where Suzy does not attempt to kill Baby Suzy, Vihvelin has not shown that Suzy would have failed had she tried to kill Baby Suzy. For, Baby Suzy might have been reinstated. Hence, even granting Vihvelin’s own assumptions, a Lewisian can assert that Suzy can kill Baby Suzy. Reinstatement does not require a “big” miracle; so autoinfanticide is no biggie.

中文翻译：

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Autoinfanticide 没什么大不了：对 Vihvelin 的复职答复

大卫刘易斯试图在没有对时间旅行者过去采取行动的能力进行特殊限制的情况下始终如一地化解祖父悖论是有争议的。Kadri Vihvelin 使用可能的自体杀婴案例——杀死自己的婴儿——以刘易斯的理由论证刘易斯是错误的，因为所有反事实的自体杀婴尝试都会失败。我提出刘易斯对维赫维林的新辩护，前提是个人复职的可能性，其中一个过早死亡的人是从以前的实时扫描中收集的信息中复制出来的。我以刘易斯的理由争辩说，在 Vihvelin 案件中，Suzy 没有试图杀死 Baby Suzy，Vihvelin 没有证明 Suzy 如果试图杀死 Baby Suzy 会失败。因为，Baby Suzy 可能已经复职了。因此，即使承认 Vihvelin 自己的假设，刘易斯也可以断言 Suzy 可以杀死 Baby Suzy。复职不需要“大”奇迹；所以自动杀婴没什么大不了的。